Abstract. We apply Exploratory Data Analysis to some of the basic models of neoclassical computational finance. These include the portfolio selection algorithm of Markowitz, the Capital Market Line of Sharpe, and the option pricing model of BlackScholes-Merton. We demonstrate that the Markowitzian assumption of positive correlation of expected return and volatility is not supported by the data. The notion that an index fund based on market cap weighting is optimal is also shown to be inconsistent with market data. It is noted that the option pricing model of Black-Scholes-Merton is not supported by market history. The SIMUGRAM TM , an empirical data based paradigm for portfolio selection, is discussed. It is observed that some of the basic contemporary strategies of neoclassical computational finance may be seriously flawed and might profitably be replaced by data based rules. We conclude that several Nobel Prizes in economics have been awarded for nonsense.
I. Introduction. Some very important decisions influencing the financial well being of tens of millions of people are based on the neoclassical models associated with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The EMH tells us, basically, that markets work very quickly to assimilate information so that the true value of a security is essentially the current trading price of that security. If such efficiency were real, then the total market holdings of all investors, based on the market value of each security multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, should be, in a sense "as good as it gets." If the total market portfolio could be improved upon, i.e., if we could find another combination of stocks and weights of those stocks that produced a higher expected return for a lower risk, then the total market portfolio, according to the EMH, would immediately adjust itself by price changes to correct this market inefficiency.
Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, a number of economic models have come and gone. Marxist models, which once governed the lives of hundreds of millions, have essentially become extinct except in North Korea and in some American academic departments of history and literature. Even the People's Republic of China, continuing the policies of Deng Zhao Ping, has replaced the Marxist model with one difficult to characterize, but something like a much less kind and gentle upscaling of the authoritarian regime of Singapore.
From the late 1930s through the 1970s the industrial democracies largely followed Keynesian and post Keynesian modalities. Many of the econometric models, which purported to be Keynesian, were empirical and constantly changing, depending upon the fashion of the time (and without the assumption of anything like full efficiency of the market). Keynesian models evolved into unwieldy econometric representations, whose implementations frequently required government interventions of great complexity.
The current age, accurately described as the legacy of such figures as Hayek, Friedman and others, offers holistic models of amazing simplicity. Unlike the Marxist models, which had an essential kernel of fantasy, the neoclassical models, like the proto version of Adam Smith, make a great deal of appeal to common sense. The current prevailing philosophy forms the basis of modern financial theory. More than half the aspirants for the degree of Master of Business Administration are specialists in finance, and almost all MBAs are trained in the neoclassical mode.
Critiques of the EMH are relatively rare, and when they are successfully argued, there is a tendency to try and patch the EMH in some clever way so that the objections become obviated. Indeed, because there seems to be a great deal of efficiency in the market, one sees a situation rather like that in the nineteenth century when Francis Galton found the DeMoivrean (Gaussian, Laplacian) distribution so ubiquitous, that he called it normal.
Deviations from normality, like imperfections in the emperor's new clothes, could be dealt with, even wished away.
So it has been with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. In part, there has been a failure to carry out checking of some of the consequences of the EMH because alternatives brought forth by the econometricians have been complex and subject to ad hoc alteration.
.However, it is not the case that we must treat testing the EMH as a null hypothesis with a post Keynesian hypothesis as an alternative. Modern computing enables us to build empirical data based paradigms as alternatives to those based on the EMH. If we can find significant discrepancies between consequences of the EMH and the reality of market data, then we should raise warnings for those who believe the world of markets is the efficient evolution of a random walk. Such data stressing of some of the key theorems of modern finance, including some whose creators have been awarded Nobel Prizes, is the purpose of this paper.
II. Variance as a Surrogate for Risk. Given a choice between buying a security with an annual return rate of .08 and .10 standard deviation or a security with a return rate of .08 and a standard deviation of .20, most investors will pick the security with the lower standard deviation, ceteris paribus. In Figure 1 , we show a typical picture of If µ and σ are all that matters, then the securities represented by the black circles should not be purchased. There are other consequences. If a high σ security is ever to be purchased, then it must have a higher µ than lower σ securities. In an efficient market, then, there should be a positive correlation between the expected return of a portfolio and its volatility (standard deviation). The following 1952 portfolio design paradigm of Harry Markowitz (1952 Markowitz ( , 1956 Markowitz ( , 1959 In Figure 2 , we show a σ versus µ plot for 75 years of one of the oldest large cap indices, the Ibbotson. The correlation is -.317, negative rather than positive. What are we to make of this? Clearly, the investors, operating rationally in the aggregate as the EMH supposes, see factors in the market beyond µ and σ. If the correlation were approximately equal to zero, we could simply note that Markowitz appears to have assumed a consequence of the EMH which is not substantiated by the historical record.
But the correlation is actually negative. We know that a number of financial advisors recommend that investors shift from stocks to bonds in a volatile market. Such advice is not inconsistent with It is clear that if we restrict ourselves to portfolios having σ <S, a decreasing upper bound on portfolio volatility, we will obtain ever fewer feasible choices for the portfolio as we decrease S. However, the same would be true if we decided, say, to bound the weighted ages of the CFOs of the companies of the securities considered. In other words, since there is more than a question as to the positive correlation between return and volatility, the Markowitzian basis of modern portfolio theory is brought into serious question as an empirical matter.
It is fairly clear that there are more variables associated with a security than µ and σ.
Herein lies a serious problem, for, since stock prices do not follow a Gaussian path, µ and σ are insufficient to describe the attributes of a security.
III. The Capital Market Line and Index Funds.
Let us make the following typical EMH assumptions.
1. The µ and σ of a portfolio adequately describe it for the purpose of investor decision making.
2. Investors can borrow and lend as much as they want at the riskless rate of interest.
3. All investors have the same expectations regarding the future, the same portfolios available to them, and the same time horizon.
4. Taxes, transactions costs, inflation, and changes in interest rates may be ignored.
Under the assumptions above, all investors will have identical opportunity sets, borrowing and lending rates (r=r B = r L ) and thus identical optimal borrowing-lending portfolios, say X(see Figure 3) . Here M represents the total market. Because all investors will be seeking to acquire the same portfolio (M), and will then borrow or lend to move along the Capital Market Line in Figure 3 , it must follow for equilibrium to be achieved that all existing securities be contained in the portfolio (M). In other words, all securities must be owned by somebody, and any security not initially contained in X would drop in price until it did qualify. Therefore, the portfolio held by each individual would be identical to all others and a microcosm of the market, with each security holding bearing the same proportion to the total portfolio as that security's total market value would bear to the total market value of all securities. In no other way could equilibrium be achieved in the capital market under the assumptions stated above.
If an investor wished to go for a higher yield for his capital, then he could do no better than to borrow at the r rate and invest more in the market portfolio M continuing on the dashed line in Figure 3 . A more conservative investor might choose to have rather more money at the risk free borrowing rate r winding up at the portfolio X. So he or she would go down the CML toward the riskless rate r. A moment's reflection reveals that something like this portfolio is achieved by TIAA-CREF investors, who have a blend of low risk bonds and a basket of stocks which is an approximation to the total market. Nobody can do better, based on the axioms above, than pick a portfolio along the Capital Market Line. Any other strategy must give a portfolio lying below and to the right of the CML. If there were a security that lay above the CML, then it would be such a good deal that it would be purchased quickly, raising its cost (and thus lowering its return) to the point where the end result would lie no higher than the CML. All the portfolios on the CML "super efficient" frontier should dominate those on the Markowitz efficient frontier. This is the theory. And on the basis of this theory, we have a plethora of market cap weighted index funds, ranging from full market funds based on the Wilshire, to "spider" funds based on a combination of securities within a specific sector. For his development of Capital Market Theory, William Sharpe (1964) received, in 1990, a Nobel Prize in Economics.
The work of Sharpe may be said to form the basis of index funds. From this standpoint, all investors should hold the market portfolio leveraged or de-leveraged by moving up and down the CML to achieve whatever level of volatility they can tolerate. It should not be possible to create a portfolio lying above the CML. According to the theory of some, such as John Bogle (1999) , founder of the Vanguard Funds, one should consider simply investing in a basket of funds which emulates the total market. There is little doubt that, over the past several decades, index funds have tended to best the managed funds. True believers in the Efficient Market Hypothesis might hold that this result is the clear consequence of the efficiency of the market.
Recently, Wojciechowski and Thompson (2004) have considered looking, year by year, at 50,000 portfolios consisting of random selections of stocks from the 1,000 highest market cap securities. We note the results for 1993: 
IV. Black-Scholes-Merton and Their Amazing Money Machine. We recall that a
call option is the right (but not the obligation) to buy a security of current price S(t) for strike price X at a future time T.
At this point, we note that there are situations where options may be a very good thing. A corn farmer with a healthy crop in view may decide to realize needed capital two months before harvest by selling options on some or all of his crop. This is the "bright side of the force."
The "dark side of the force" has to do with using options as a means to get around the margin rules put in place by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Before this Act, one could leverage new purchases of securities against his or her existing portfolio using a margin ratio of as high as ten to one. That meant that if one had a portfolio consisting of 1,000 shares of a stock selling for $100, one could buy an additional 9,000 shares of stock at $100 per share. However, if the price of the stock then dropped below $90, the broker would seize the investor's entire holding to cover the "margin call. " Obviously, in a falling market, such flexibility of margin could cause an unstable control situation where stocks spiraled downward. In the 1930s, the rules were changed so that margin ratios could not exceed two to one.
Using options as a way to exercise leverage would appear to get around this difficulty of unstable control, since the option is purchased up front. However, let us suppose we consider a company which sells electricity options to local utilities based on uncovered obligations (for example, the company does not own gas or oil assets which can be used to generate the electricity). Then, suppose prices rise continually over the time before the option can be exercised. The company might simply have to default on its option obligations, since it has overreached its resources. Such a default jolts the system, for then the local utilities have to go back into the spot market to obtain electricity. This forces contract prices to go up, and we are back to a state of unstable control. For this reason, Warren Buffett has called options, "financial weapons of mass destruction."
What is the "fair price" C of a call option? Of course, the answer is "there is no such thing." However, if we insist on finding such a price based on expectation, one natural answer is
C = exp(-µT) E{Max(0,S(T) -X)}
(1)
Here, we have brought the price to present value, using the rate of the security.
For reasons too convoluted and political to go into here, the investment banking industry in the early 1970s wished to come up with an answer which did not involve the parameter µ. µ is, after all, an unknown which has to be estimated from past data plus whatever additional information that can be gleaned. If we could remove µ from the picture and replace it with a more or less known interest rate r, that would be preferred. Of course, then we would have taken a noisy phenomenon, such as the market price of a stock at a future time, stochastized it further by looking at a derivative value of that price, and come up with a deterministic evaluation. One might suppose that the tailors of the emperor's new clothes would have to be very artful indeed to come up with such a result. In 1973, Black and Scholes (1973) produced such a garment:
µ has been eliminated, because it is now assumed that we continuously rebalance a covering portfolio at zero transaction costs. In 1997, for their work, Scholes and Merton (Black having passed away) received a Nobel Prize in Economics.
The Black-Scholes price might be said to be "politically correct" from the standpoint of modern neoclassical finance. The Black-Scholes result is shaken in the face of the unwary with the same intensity used by the followers of Mao with their little red book during the Chinese Cultural Revolution.
Let us simply note, in passing, that transaction costs really are not free, and that continuous rebalancing is hard to approximate economically. But beyond that, looking at historical data, we can observe that the Black-Scholes price for an option seldom agrees with the actual price quoted on the ticker. There is, apparently, a neat way around this dilemma. One does not use an historically data based estimate for σ. Rather, we read from the ticker the actual market price of the option, plug it into (2) and solve for the "implied volatility" σ . This kind of strong circularity of argument would seem to insulate the Black-Scholes result from criticism based on real data. However, such is not the case.
For two different strike prices (X) with the same date of execution, we typically get two different values of implied volatility.
The Black-Scholes result, applied to all manner of exotic derivatives, would appear to provide hope for employment for those who like to develop numerical approximations for solving the heat equation. However, the difficulties experienced by ENRON and other companies who relied strongly on the Black-Scholes result to run their businesses must begin to cast doubt on the model.
Even if the Black-Scholes engine were not hopelessly flawed, from the standpoint of the investor, we note that looking at expectations and variances does not tell the whole story.
We need to look at the time indexed distribution functions of the payoffs. Consider the case of a buyer considering the purchase of options on a stock with initial price of $100.
Suppose she correctly guesses that σ = .20. Suppose the Treasury bill interest rate is r = .05. Suppose T is six months, and the strike price X = $108. Suppose that µ = .15. The
Black-Scholes price for the option is $3.54. The expected value of the option is $7.23.
We note in Figure 5 that in this "best of all possible worlds" scenario, the investor has bought an option which is of no value 55% of the time. Once again, we note that building strategies based on expectations is dangerous. And we further observe how quickly we can buy into somebody else's use of misleading language. A "hedge" implies a kind of conservatism. Yet "hedge funds" frequently are built on the buying and selling of options. So, accepting the notion that a "hedge fund" is safe is rather like accepting a sign reading "Honest John the Used Care Salesman" at face value. Indeed, Scholes and Merton were conspicuous advisors (Black was deceased) to LTCM.
It is significant that Dr. Greenspan did not question the underlying models followed by LTCM. Rather, he worked on the assumption that the LTCM failure was an extremely rare event unlikely to repeat itself.
Unfortunately, Chairman Greenspan acted like a true believer who, when facts are not in accord with cherished beliefs, fails to use facts to modify theory. He reacted quickly to avert the embarrassment caused by what was supposed to be "a six sigma event." Across America, company chieftains, growing accustomed to cooking their books in order to gain the time necessary for their "risk neutral" approaches to bear fruit, heaved a collective sigh of relief and redoubled their cooking. The large accounting firms, whose external reviews were supposed to prevent sharp practice, proceeded to take ever more lenient views of the cunning of their clients. Indeed, the writing of uncovered options and other dubious business practices expanded after LTCM. Chairman Greenspan could have seen a natural dampening of "irrational exuberance" already in 1998 had he simply let LTCM fail. By bailing out LTCM on the one hand, and stifling investment capital on the other, it appears he acted with the wisdom one tends to associate with the economic planners of, say, Argentina.
Persons on fixed incomes must now live with low bank interest rates after Greenspan tried to resuscitate the hypoxic stock market (which he himself had deprived of oxygen for 18 months) by dropping interest rates over 500 basis points from the highs in 2000. Thompson, Williams and Findlay (2003) .] This is a computer intensive expert system which looks at the synchronized historical performance of the stocks in a selection set and uses this information to develop a high return, low risk portfolio. Again, the portfolio is rebalanced once a year. (The SIMUGRAM TM algorithm does not generally conform to a "buy and hold" strategy.) We show the results of 35 years of applying the SIMUGRAM TM portfolio paradigm, ex ante, to the stocks in the S&P 100 in Figure 6 . We note that the aggregate return, exclusive of dividends, is equivalent to a continuously compounded interest rate of 20.0%. This is a rate of return comparable to those generally associated with Warren Buffett's Berkshire
Hathaway. We note that, over the 35 years starting in 1970, the total negative returns in losing years are a minus 112.74%, less than those experienced by the S&P 100 but more than those of the equally weighted portfolio. We have demonstrated, however, that there are possibilities for building investment strategies which are dependent, not on models, but on data based empiricism. As
Vilfredo Pareto taught us a century ago, there is an underlying current of rational order in economics. But the world is a complex, dynamic system of systems consisting, in large measure, of departures from simplistic "laws" seemingly complete, but in reality, incomplete. Our task should be to maneuver in this real world of staggering complexity.
To assist us in this task, we have modern high speed computing coupled with speedy access to huge bases of data. Thomas Alva Edison, in his quest for producing a usable electric light bulb, tried hundreds of filaments oriented toward the goal of always moving toward better candidates. It can be argued that this was engineering rather than science. Just so. We are in an age in computational finance where our efforts should be directed toward an engineering approach. Our software algorithms are the filaments and computers and data bases our laboratory.
